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ABSTRACT
By setting the regulatory-approved protocol for a suite of first-in-human studies on BIA
10-2474 against the subsequent French investigations, we highlight six key design and
statistical issues which reinforce recommendations by a Royal Statistical Society Working
Party which were made in the aftermath of cytokine release storm in six healthy volunteers in
the UK in 2006. 
The six issues are: dose determination; availability of pharmacokinetic results; dosing
interval; stopping rules; appraisal by safety committee; clear algorithm required if
combining approvals for single and multiple ascending dose studies.
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Background
Cytokine release storm in six healthy volunteers in 2006: In the United Kingdom (UK), Te 
Genero’s highly novel monoclonal antibody TGN1412 caused a cytokine release storm in all 
6 healthy male volunteers who received it in an initial first-in-human (FIH) cohort of eight 
subjects, two of whom were randomized to placebo [1]. Cytokine release storm was an 
anticipated serious adverse event but the chance of its occurrence was presumed low.   A 




































Germany’s Te Genero. The UK regulator and ethics committee had permitted an 
inter-administration interval of only 10 minutes between subjects.  
The Royal Statistical Society’s (RSS) Working Party on Statistical Issues in First-in-Man 
Studies therefore recommended the justification always of a proper inter-administration 
interval between successive subjects, and also specification of the waiting time for 
laboratory-based results which pertained to subjects’  ‘safety’[2], see  BOX 1.   As we shall 
see, both issues recurred in the suite of FIH studies in France on BIA 10-2474, an inhibitor of 
fatty acid amide hydrolase (FAAH). 
The Duff report on TGN1412[3] led to a revised European guideline on strategies to identify 
and mitigate risks for FIH trials[4], but its provisions on inter-administration intervals had 
been weakened through consultation[5]. The European Medicines Agency is consulting until 
February 2017 on its November 2016 revision[6] which, although substantially improved, 
remains insufficiently strict in section 8.2 on precautions to apply between treating subjects 
within a cohort, see below; and between cohorts, see BOX 2.
Fatality and four other serious-adverse-event hospitalizations in healthy volunteers in 2016: 
France’s Agence Nationale de Securite du Medicament et des Produits de Santé (ANSM) 
gave approval on 26 June 2015 for a contract research organization, Biotrial, to conduct a 
suite of healthy volunteer FIH studies in Rennes on the Portuguese firm BIAL’s 
FAAH-inhibitor, BIA 10-2474[7].  
Despite seven single ascending dose (SAD) escalations (6 of them doublings from 1.25 mg to
40 mg; then 100 mg) and a shift to multiple ascending doses (MAD) which were unspecified 
in the protocol but entailed once-daily administration for 10 days, only two subjects (one 
actively treated, one placebo) in the initial lowest-dose SAD cohort (0.25 mg) were 
administered their assigned medication 24 hours ahead of the remaining six volunteers in the 
SAD-1 cohort (five actively treated, one placebo). Subsequent SAD and MAD cohorts of 
eight subjects (six actively treated, two placebo) lacked even a single sentinel-pair, see BOX 
3.
Tragically, on 10 January 2016, the fifth day of daily dosing at 50 mg in the MAD-5 cohort, 
BIA 10-2474 caused the sudden onset of symptoms (including blurred vision and severe 
headache; also slurred speech and ataxia, as recently revealed [8]) and, by evening, 
hospitalization of a healthy male volunteer who became comatose by late morning on 11 
January and died on 17 January 2016[7]. Notwithstanding his hospitalization (and clinical 
symptoms in a second volunteer on Day 5[8]), the remainder of the MAD-5 cohort received 
their sixth dose at around 8 o’clock in the morning of 11 January. Of the five who were 
actively treated on Day 6, two developed neurological symptoms and were hospitalized that 











































Chronology, disclosures and investigations in France
Biotrial/BIAL suspended the MAD-5 cohort on 11 January 2016 after the condition of the 
first hospitalized volunteer worsened and symptom onset in two others; ANSM was informed
on 14 January; the Biotrial protocol[9] was published on 22 January 2016, after Le Figaro had 
leaked it[10]; preliminary and final reports by Inspection Generale des Affaires Sociales 
(IGAS) were made on 4 February and 23 May[7 11 12]; and by France’s Temporary Specialist 
Scientific Committee (TSSC) on 7 March and 19 April[13]. The TSSC had access to the 
Investigator Brochure (IB) which describes dose-related adverse events in four animal 
species[13]. The IB has also been leaked but, even 11 months after the fatality on 17 January 
2016, BIAL has failed to publish the IB despite repeated calls for its publication [7 14-16]. The 
French press [17-20] has made important disclosures at the behest of volunteers and in defence 
of Biotrial’s duty-doctor, some of which conflict with the investigatory accounts.
The TSSC strongly suspected that an off-target effect of BIA 10-2474 was responsible [13]. If 
BIA 10-2474’s mode of action was solely FAAH-inhibition, TSSC questioned the exposure of
healthy volunteers to doses higher than 5 mg, as FAAH inhibition had already occurred 
although extrapolation from pre-clinical studies had suggested 10-40mg could be needed for 
FAAH-inhibition. Pharmacodynamic (PD) analyses showing 100% FAAH inhibition by 5mg 
should have been available to inform dose escalation decisions in subsequent SAD cohorts, 
let alone in MAD cohorts [16]. The testing of very high non-pharmacological doses to establish
a Maximum Tolerated Dose is ill-advised in healthy volunteers [6].
The TSSC noted steepness in the dose-escalation curve and apparent lengthening of the 
half-life so that dose-escalation should have been moderated and informed by the preceding 
cohort’s PK results, see BOX 3. The TSSC also cautioned that individual variation in 
pharmacokinetic (PK) parameters, not just means, matters: see Bayesian methods in 
pharmaceutical practice [21].
Lacking from the investigatory accounts:  As statisticians, we had expected critical 
examination of  the ANSM-approved BIAL/Biotrial protocol including comparison of what 
was written in the protocol with what was done; an audit-trail of dates for the receipt at 
BIAL/Biotrial of each cohort’s analysed PK and/or PD results; clear documentation of the 
data (PK and/or PD, adverse events, external) that were appraised by the BIAL/Biotrial safety
committee at each dose-escalation decision – especially the decision to administer  50 mg 
daily for 10 days when the approved protocol had made no explicit mention of a 50 mg dose; 
and an unambiguous account (by assigned treatment, volunteer code, and ideally with 
consent) of the adverse events experienced. In extremis in FIH studies, as here, medical 












































Focus on key statistical issues
By setting the ANSM-approved protocol against the subsequent investigations, we highlight 
six key design and statistical issues which reinforce recommendations by the RSS working 
party, see BOX 1. The six issues are: dose determination; availability of PK results; dosing 
interval; stopping rules; appraisal by safety committee; clear algorithm if combining 
SAD/MAD approvals.
Dose determination – rationale and in practice: No dose was pre-specified in the 
ANSM-approved protocol for any MAD cohort: if the maximum tolerated dose was not 
reached after completing MAD-4, ANSM permitted that up to four additional MAD cohorts 
could be added. The Ethics Committee, which gave approval on 3 July 2015, had queried 
what information would be given to MAD volunteers about the scheme for determining 
which doses to administer. Re-assurance was given to the Ethics Committee that volunteers 
would be told the assigned dose [7], but this is not the same as explaining the rationale for how
that dose was determined. 
On 24 April 2016, De Pracontal reported that volunteer 2508 (who subsequently died) had 
recounted to his partner that the team at Biotrial had decided to increase the administered 
dose in MAD-5 from 40 mg to 50 mg “because they had estimated that there would not be 
enough of effects at 40 mg” [18]. For this dose-escalation in particular, investigatory reports 
should have clearly specified: i) the PK (and, see BOX 2, PD [6]) analyses from previous SAD
and MAD cohorts that were actually considered by the safety committee, ii) the adverse 
events from previous SAD and MAD cohorts that were appraised by the safety committee, 
iii) pertinent other information considered and iv) the written final rationale by which the 
safety committee authorized escalation from 20 mg daily for 10 days in MAD-4  to 50 mg 
daily for 10 days in the MAD-5 cohort. 
Safety precautions – PK results, per-protocol versus in practice:  The ANSM-approved 
protocol had clearly stated that the dose levels for the first 4 MAD cohorts would be 
determined: “after evaluation of the safety, tolerability and available pharmacokinetic (PK)
results of previous SAD and MAD (when applicable) dose groups.”  As the interval between
SAD and MAD cohorts was 7 to 14 days except for the SAD-2 cohort (31 days) and MAD-5 
cohort (18 days), Eddleston et al.[22] concluded: “Except for the second cohort, the delay 
between cohorts did not allow the previous cohort’s pharmacokinetics to be considered before
starting another, something recommended in the RSS report”. The planned last study in the 
FIH suite of four was for PD analyses.
Collection schedules (for blood and urine samples) and a data analysis plan were set out. But 
there was no schedule for Biotrial’s receipt of PK results. And despite calling for a debate on 
open data from FIH studies [13], the TSSC did not disclose the actual PK results from 
SAD-cohorts at 20 mg, 40 mg and 100 mg; nor from MAD-cohorts at 10 mg and 20 mg; nor 
precisely when the latter results were received at Biotrial7 for review by its safety committee 
as, per-protocol for the MAD cohorts (see BOX 3: PRECAUTION), they should have been 













































Divergence from what was written in the protocol for MAD versus SAD cohorts (see BOX 3)
was not highlighted when the TSSC reported that, in practice, from the MAD-3 cohort (10 
mg), administration to MAD-n cohort was based on the PK information from the MAD-(n-2) 
cohort. For the MAD-5 cohort (50 mg), this delay was 40 days but, as Eddleston et al. [22] 
have pointed out, the delay was only 18 days between the end-date of the MAD-4 (20 mg) 
and initiation of MAD- 5: too short for the PK information from the MAD-4 cohort to have 
been taken into account [2 3]. 
Safety precautions – dosing interval  and escalation stopping rules, per-protocol versus in 
practice:  The protocol stated that, if there were drug safety concerns for MAD-cohorts, the 
subjects’ dosing would be staggered (a maximum of 4 subjects dosed on the same day and 24 
hours of follow-up necessary before dosing the remaining subjects). This did not happen and 
so we may infer that the safety committee had no such concerns.
Stopping rules for safety, given as a guideline only in the protocol, stated that the dose should
not be escalated further if one of four circumstances occurred in subjects within the same 
cohort (our italics), unless it was obvious that the occurrence was not related to the 
administration of the treatment.  First of these four circumstances was: drug-related severe 
adverse event of the same character in 4 or more subjects. The other three (laboratory 
abnormalities; changes in vital signs; confirmed changes in ECG) required clinically 
significant drug-related occurrence in 6 or more subjects – despite each cohort having only 6
actively treated subjects.
Biotrial claimed that its FIH designs were in line with current regulatory guidance. If so, 
stopping rules for safety in FIH studies need to be reviewed since the approved protocol 
permitted drug-related severe adverse events to be observed in half the healthy volunteers 
without necessitating a stay on dose-escalation. By contrast, several published designs use 
dose-response models to curb the adoption of dangerously high doses by predicting safety 
outcomes for future cohorts [23-25].
Appraisal by safety committee– per-protocol versus in practice: As is required in Phase I 
studies, dose-escalation in the MAD stage was also conditional on the absence of toxic effects
in volunteers at the preceding dose-level upon appraisal by an advisory committee. Unlike in 
Phase II/III studies, there is no requirement for independent membership of Phase 1 safety 
committees. The BIAL/Biotrial advisory committee judged that double-vision, later described
by TSSC as blurred vision [13] (compare page 18 in second report versus page 10 in first), on 
two separate occasions in each of two volunteers in MAD-3 (10 mg) was unrelated to the 
study drug and so permitted MAD-4 (20 mg) to proceed.  
In combination, a lack of transparent audit by BIAL/Biotrial and inconsistent documentation 
by TSSC about adverse events necessitated recourse to newspaper reports.  In May 2016, Le 
Figaro reported that magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) in 2016 for volunteers in the suite of 
BIA 10-2474 FIH studies had revealed that an actively-treated volunteer 2305, one of the two
with visual disturbances in MAD-3 (10 mg), had had a cerebral vascular accident which may 
have occurred proximal to his participation in MAD-3.  Le Figaro, citing an unpublished 














































10 mg or 20 mg, which TSSC classed as non-severe [13]. The neurological symptoms on 10 
January presented by the volunteer who subsequently died included double-vision and 
headache among others [8], as confirmed by Mediapart’s publication of correspondence by the 
duty-doctor at Biotrial who referred this volunteer to hospital. On referral, the duty-doctor 
asked whether the patient’s condition might be related to the study drug [20]. The IB was made 
available to the intensivists during their treatment of the hospitalized volunteers but how 
quickly remains to be established.
To date, there is no properly-dated, consistent account of which PK evaluation reports were 
received when, and which of them - alongside which adverse-event reports – were considered
by the BIAL/Biotrial safety committee prior to approving the next dose escalation. Press 
reporting of volunteers’ experience of adverse events (blurred vision or double-vision; 
duration; severity of headaches) can appear at odds with the investigatory-teams on what 
transpired in terms of the evolution of adverse events - including on the morning, afternoon 
and evening of 10 January 2016 [8] - which led to the hospitalization of a volunteer who had 
received five 50 mg daily doses of BIA 10-2474. 
Combined-approval of SAD and MAD stages needs clear algorithm: The suite of FIH studies 
on BIA 10-2474 combined SAD and MAD stages. Had the latter been independently 
presented for regulatory and ethical approval,  the SAD results would need to have been 
presented to justify the conduct of the MAD stage. By putting these two stages together,  the 
sponsor made such a review  impossible. It thus behoved the sponsor to make sure that a clear
algorithm for proceeding to, and through, the MAD stage  - based on previous results -  was 
provided.
Flexible trials[26], in which the information gained early on is used to modify subsequent 
conduct, have received much theoretical attention in recent years. Regulators do not permit 
their use in Phase II/III without explicit rules covering modfication and the provision of 
stringent safeguards. Similar safeguards ought to apply in Phase I.
Discussion
A common expectation in multiple dose studies is that, based on the available PK 
information,  the steady state concentration that a chosen regimen is expected to reach should 
not be higher than that already tested in single dose studies. Given that the highest SAD dose 
had been 100 mg, a 50 mg daily dose over 10 days would be hard to justify unless it were 
known that elimination of the drug was fairly rapid (say, linear with a half-life of at most one 
day). Instead, according to TSSC, BIA 10-2474 had a long half-life which extended with 
increased doses [13] but the actual PK results were not disclosed.
To enable others to do better, it is important that information on the design and conduct of the














































Conclusions:  If there is high inter-volunteer variation in susceptibility to risk, a single 
sentinel-pair {active; placebo}, treated 24 hours ahead of other volunteers in the lowest dose 
FIH cohort only,  as in BIA 10-2474, will be generally insufficient. Implementation of the 
current [4] (and future draft [6]) European guideline on risk mitigation needs to be more 
thoughtful: both between volunteers within a cohort; and in determining dose-level 
per-cohort. Regulators should specifically assess how well safeguarding is justified 
per-cohort (eg reliance on single or multiple sentinel-pairs, each at 24 hour intervals); and 
should appraise the principles (eg on inhibition; maximum occupancy) and precautionary 
practice by which the dose-level per-cohort will be decided in the light of pharmacological 
effects at preceding dose-levels. Guidelines serve to assist, not abrogate, thoughtfulness.
In the UK, clinical research organizations are registered by the regulator. European regulators
should be able to de-register contract research organizations if the safety precautions that 
were written into approved protocols are weakened in practice.
Regulators should be extremely wary of stopping rules for dose-escalation in FIH studies 
which require at least two-thirds of the actively-treated healthy volunteers to experience 
severe adverse events before stopping is invoked. The occurrence of possibly related events 
in preceding cohorts should be taken into consideration [2]. Consideration might be given to 
whether having a written charter [27], which sets out the independent membership, role and 
responsibilities of safety committees for FIH studies, would assist them.
By offering staged approvals, regulators could enable pharmaceutical companies to invoke 
adaptive designs for FIH studies which use Bayesian methods formally to incorporate PK 
information from all preceding cohorts. Properly used, and with explicit assumptions, these 
designs hope to optimize both the number of subjects and the active: placebo ratio for the 
next cohort of healthy volunteers exposed to higher doses [2].
Latitude in approved protocols should never extend to wholly unspecified dose-levels [6]. A 
mechanism is needed for an approved protocol-variation if later dose levels are to be 
escalated exceptionally (for example, supra-pharmacologically) in the light of data from 
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BOX 1: Royal Statistical Society’s Working Party on Statistical Issues in First-in-Man 
Studies [2] made 21 recommendations, of which we list 11 below.
R4. Before proceeding to a first-in-man study, there should be:
(a)  quantitative justification of the starting dose—based on suitable preclinical studies and 
relevant calculations;
(b)  a priori assessment of the risk level for the recommended study dose(s);
(c) appraisal of the uncertainty about these recommendations.
R9. Unless arguments have been provided that the risk is so low that simultaneous treatments 
are acceptable, in order to allow early evidence of toxicity to halt the trial without risk to 
subsequent subjects, a proper, or sufficient, inter-administration interval needs to be proposed
and observed.
R10. First-in-man study protocols should provide:
(a) justification of the proper interval between administration to successive subjects;
(b) justification of the dose steps the trial will use;
(c) operational definition of ‘safety’ if investigating safety and tolerability;
(d) delay between receiving biomarker or other laboratory results which determine ‘safety’ 
and having obtained the relevant biological sample;
(e) prior estimates of the expected number (or rate) of adverse reactions by dose, especially 
those serious enough to raise questions about ‘safety’.
R11. Appropriate sample sizes for first-in-man studies can be better justified statistically—
rather than by mere custom and practice—when ‘safety’ has been given an operational 
definition.
R12. First-in-man study protocols should discuss their chosen design and its limitations 
together with the implications for analysis. For example, if an unequal allocation between 
treatment and placebo per dose step is chosen, this affects the ability of the data safety 
monitors to assess tolerability most efficiently before proceeding to a further dose escalation 
step. 
R13. First-in-man study protocols should describe their intended analysis in sufficient detail 
to allow protocol reviewers (and the independent research ethics committee) to determine 
whether the objectives, design and proposed analyses are compatible. 
R14.The design of first-in-man trials and the analysis of the data should reflect realistic 





































R16. For first-in-man studies, the standard of informed consent to be observed is ‘open 
protocol, hidden allocation’—i.e. all aspects of the trial design shall be shared with subjects 
to be recruited. 
R17. Public debate and research are needed about the maximum acceptable level of risk for 
first-in-man studies in healthy volunteers, and about whether there should be risk-adjusted 
remuneration of healthy volunteers. 
R18. Competent drug regulatory authorities should provide a mechanism for the 
pharmaceutical industry to collect and share data on serious adverse reactions in first-in-man 
studies—to improve a priori risk assessment. 
(a)  For example, separate syntheses of study designs and of the occurrences of predicted, 
theoretical and unprecedented harms—either as serious adverse events or distributional 
changes in biomarkers—should be considered for healthy volunteers and for patients, by type
and novelty of compound, and by a priori assessed level of risk.
(b)  In particular, for the UK, the MHRA should report annually on the designs of, and 
serious adverse events (whether for the first exposed cohort or at a dose escalation step) in, 
first-in-man studies in healthy volunteers (versus patients) that involved administration of a 
biological or biotechnology, and for those that involved a chemical compound. 
(c)  The MHRA should also take responsibility for maintaining a central registry of 
participating volunteers in the UK.
R19. Statistical reporting of preclinical studies should be improved to be comparable with the

































BOX 2: European guidelines on strategies to identify and mitigate risks for 
First-in-Human trials.
2.1 Draft for consultation [5], page 9 (our italics): 
“For trials with high-risk medicinal products, an initial sequential dose administration design 
should be employed within each cohort in order to minimise any risks. Any non-sequential 
dose administration within each cohort should be justified . . . “
2.2 As finalized in 2009[4], page 10 (our italics): 
“It will usually be appropriate to design the administration of the first dose so that a single 
subject receives a single dose of the active IMP. Further dose administration should be 
sequential within each cohort to mitigate the risk. Any non-sequential dose administration 
within each cohort should be justified . . .”
2.3.1 European Medicines Agency November 2016 draft Guideline on strategies to identify 
and mitigate risks for first-in-human and early clinical trials with investigational medicinal 
products (IMPs) [6], section 8.2.6 on Precautions to apply between treating subjects within a 
cohort (our italics): 
“It is considered appropriate to design the administration of the first dose in any cohort so 
that a single subject receives a single dose of the active IMP. When the study design 
includes the use of placebo it would be appropriate to allow for one subject on active and one 
on placebo to be dosed simultaneously prior to dosing the remaining subjects in the cohort.
There should be an adequate period of time between the administration of treatment to these 
first subjects in a cohort and the remaining subjects in the cohort to observe any reactions and
adverse events. The duration of the interval of observation should be justified and will depend
on the properties of the IMP and the interpretation of the available data, including 
non-clinical PK and PD. Experience and . . . “
2.3.2 European Medicines Agency November 2016 draft Guideline on strategies to identify 
and mitigate risks for first-in-human and early clinical trials with investigational medicinal 
products (IMPs) [6], section 8.2.7 on Precautions to apply between cohorts (our italics):
“Administration in the next cohort should not occur before participants in the previous cohort
have been treated and PK data, where available, or possible adverse events from those 
participants are reviewed in accordance with the protocol. Thus all relevant data from cohort 
“n” should be reviewed prior to allowing dosing of cohort “n+1”. Review of all previous 
cohorts’ data in a cumulative manner is preferred. Late emerging safety issues that may 
have occurred after the time-point for the dose escalation decision (for example, 48 hour 
safety data for each subject set as the minimum data required but significant event(s) 
happening at 7 days post dose) can then be considered.
All emerging PD, PK and safety data should be critically reviewed against the pre-defined 










































Account should be taken of any signs related to potential PD or toxicity targets identified in 
non-clinical studies. While there can be no delay for safety data, a lack of PD information or 
a reduced PK data set could be justifiable in some cases, such as a short duration of the PD 
effect.
The review should include comparison of PK, PD or PK/PD data from any previous 
cohorts with known non-clinical data and safety information to inform the decision, as 












BOX 3: Suite of four First-in-Human studies on BIA 10-2474 approved by France’s 











Single Ascending Dose (SAD) Cohorts: 8 SAD cohorts, & approval for 4 more . . . 
Pharmacokinetic (PK) PRECAUTION: PK results for SAD cohort (n-2) must be
available for review before the start of SAD cohort n [9].
SAD- 1
Begun on 9th 
July 2015
{1 active; 1 placebo}
24-hours’ delay, then
{5 active; 1 placebo}




None reported as far as
we know
SAD- 2 {6 active; 2 placebo}    1.25 mg
SAD- 3 {6 active; 2 placebo}    2.5   mg
SAD- 4 {6 active; 2 placebo}    5      mg
SAD-5 {6 active; 2 placebo}   10     mg
SAD-6 {6 active; 2 placebo}   20     mg
SAD-7 {6 active; 2 placebo}   40     mg
SAD-8 {6 active; 2 placebo} 100     mg, the 
human equivalent
of NOAEL in rats
SAD-9
Not done













{6 active; 2 placebo} 505     mg, 
maximally 












dosed at  40 mg 
on each of two 
study-days
None reported as far as
we know
Multiple Ascending Dose (MAD) Cohorts with daily dosing for 10 days: 4 MAD
cohorts but with conditional approval for 4 more [9]  . . . 
Pharmacokinetic (PK) PRECAUTION: Protocol stated that the dose levels for the 
first four MAD cohorts would be determined “after the evaluation of safety, 
tolerability and available PK results of previous SAD and MAD (when applicable) 
dose groups”.
MAD-1
Begun on 6th 
October 2015
{6 active; 2 placebo} Not pre-specified 
but     2.5 mg None reported as far as
we know
MAD-2 {6 active; 2 placebo} Not pre-specified 
but     5    mg 
MAD-3
Begun on 
{6 active; 2 placebo} Not pre-specified 
but   10    mg in 
Volunteer 2305, who 










practice blurred vision twice, also 
headache by 
press-account, and 
subsequently had cerebral 
vascular accident 
diagnosed by MRI. 
Another volunteer had 
blurred vision twice.
MAD-4 {6 active; 2 placebo} Not pre-specified 
but   20   mg in 
practice
One or two volunteers 
each had headache twice.
The ANSM-approved protocol [9] stated that, if the maximum tolerated dose was not
reached after completing the fourth MAD cohort, up to 4 additional MAD cohorts
could be added.
MAD-5











their Day 6 
dose.
{6 active; 2 placebo} Not pre-specified 
but   50   mg in 
practice
Onset of neurological 
symptoms, including 
diplopia and headache, in 
volunteer 2508 after 
dosing on Day 5. This 
volunteer was hospitalized
in the evening of 10th 
January 2016, became 
comatose in the morning 
of 11th and died on 17th 
January 2016.
Four other volunteers who 
each received a sixth 50 
mg dose of BIA 10-2474 
became symptomatic and 
were hospitalized. The 
fifth was not symptomatic 




{6 active; 2 placebo} Not pre-specified
Not doneMAD-7
Not done
{6 active; 2 placebo} Not pre-specified
MAD-8
Not done
{6 active; 2 placebo} Not pre-specified
Pharmacodynamic study on 20 healthy volunteers: Not done
17
49
497
50
51
